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SURVEY SECTION
Tort Law. Barone v. Christmas Tree Shop, 767 A.2d 66 (R.I.
2001). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a claim of negli-
gence in a slip and fall case must include evidence of the nature
and extent of the slippery substance, along with evidence concern-
ing the length of time the substance was present at the site.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Caroline Barone (plaintiff) entered The Christmas
Tree Shop (defendant or shop) at approximately 10 A.M. on a
snowy wet day.' While perusing the merchandise, plaintiff slipped
and fell, fracturing her leg.2 Plaintiff testified that she fell on a
wet substance, but did not notice any water on the floor while she
was awaiting assistance. 3
Judith Kerr (Kerr), the assistant store manager, testified that
the entrance area of the store was carpeted and mats designed to
absorb excess water were present near the entrance. 4 Kerr also
testified that the floor where the plaintiff fell was clean and dry at
the time of the accident.6
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for the entry of
judgment as a matter of law, stating that no evidence had been
offered regarding the condition of the floor at the exact location
where the plaintiff fell.6 Plaintiff appealed. 7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court found it determinative that no testimony
was received concerning the nature and extent of any water on the
floor at the precise location where plaintiff fell.8 It is settled law
that a plaintiff who has fallen and is claiming negligence must pre-
sent evidence proving that he or she fell because of an unsafe con-
dition that the defendant was or should have been aware, and that
the condition existed for a long enough time to allow the owner or
1. Barone v. Christmas Tree Shop, 767 A.2d 66, 67 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 67-68.
5. Id. at 68.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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occupier of the premises to remedy the situation.9 In the instant
case, evidence regarding the nature and extent of the water at the
site of the fall was not presented. 10 Furthermore, no evidence re-
garding the length of time the slippery substance was present at
the location was introduced." As there was a complete absence of
evidence substantiating a claim of negligence against the defen-
dant, the trial justice did not err in granting a motion for judgment
as a matter of law.12
Justice Goldberg dissented. In her dissent she pointed out that
both the plaintiff and her sister testified that there were puddles of
water at various locations within the shop.13 In addition, the pres-
ence of absorbent floor mats at the entryway was not established.14
Since the plaintiff had identified the substance she slipped on as
water in her testimony, the finding of the trial justice that there
was no evidence offered as to the condition of the precise location of
the floor that the fall occurred was incorrect.' 5 This impermissible
determination of fact by the trial justice constituted a violation of
Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 Enough
evidence existed in this case to create an inference of negligence. 17
CONCLUSION
Since the plaintiff failed to present any evidence of the nature
and extent of the "slippery substance" at the site of her fall in the
defendant's shop, the judgment of the superior court was
affirmed.' 8
Susan Knorr Rodriguez
9. Id. (citing Massart v. Toys R Us, Inc., 708 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I. 1998)).
10. Id. at 68.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 69.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 70.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 71.
18. Id. at 69.
SURVEY SECTION
Tort Law. Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 765 A.2d 1203 (R.I. 2001). (1)
The trial court's refusal to allow pediatric surgeon to question a
patient's mother regarding informed consent was not an abuse of
discretion where the questions were repetitious of surgeon's long
cross-examination of mother. (2) Articles from two medical jour-
nals were not admissible, under the learned treatise exception to
the hearsay rule, for use in cross-examining defendant pediatric
surgeon and his medical expert, where no expert witness had au-
thenticated the articles as reliable. (3) Deposition testimony of pa-
tient's father that two physicians had told him that defendant
pediatric surgeon's performance of surgery on patient had violated
the standard of care was inadmissible hearsay in medical malprac-
tice trial, where the declarations were offered to prove that the sur-
geon had violated the standard of care. (4) Minor patient's parents
failed to preserve appellate review of their constitutional challenge
to Rhode Island statute regarding prejudgment interest in medical
malpractice actions, where Attorney General had not been served
with a copy of the proceeding and had not been given an opportu-
nity to be heard at the trial level.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 30, 1989, plaintiff, Donna Flanagan (Flanagan or
plaintiff), brought her eleven-month-old daughter, Ashley, to de-
fendant Dr. Conrad Wesselhoeft (Wesselhoeft or defendant), a sur-
geon, to examine an enlarged cervical node below Ashley's right
ear.' The examination lasted about five or six minutes; Wes-
selhoeft informed Flannagan the node would have to be removed
and biopsied. 2 The defendant warned only of the risk of infection
and bleeding; no further discussion took place between the initial
consultation and the surgery.3 The surgery took place on Septem-
ber 27, 1989.4 About a month after the surgery Flanagan noticed
the child seemed to be "winging"; a condition resulting in a droop-
ing shoulder and protruding scapula.5 This condition was later di-
agnosed as a probable severed spinal accessory nerve in the child's
1. Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 765 A.2d 1203, 1205 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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neck resulting from the surgery performed by defendant. 6 Another
surgeon, Dr. Melvin Rosenwasser, performed corrective surgery
and successfully repaired the severed nerve.7 After convalescing,
Ashley fully recovered."
In September, 1992, plaintiffs filed an action against Wes-
selhoeft and a resident physician at Rhode Island Hospital. 9 In
that case, the superior court ruled in favor of defendant on a judg-
ment as a matter of law and the state supreme court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.10 Upon remand, in front of a jury, a
judgment for plaintiffs was reached with damages assessed at
$209,446 in favor of the child and $41,889 in favor of the mother."
Wesselhoeft appealed arguing three points: (1) that the trial court
erred in sustaining several of plaintiffs objections to cross-exami-
nation questions of Donna Flanagan regarding her knowledge of
the risks of surgery and whether she would have gone ahead with
the surgery regardless of the risks;12 (2) that the trial court erred
in allowing excerpts from medical publications, used as part of the
subject of cross-examination, to be read into evidence without first
having been authenticated by an expert, and;13 (3) the trial court
erred in allowing a deposition to be read into evidence that con-
tained hearsay statements.' 4 Flanagan cross-appealed challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute that fixes the
date of prejudgment interest in medical malpractice cases.1h
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court handled the issues in "order of their importance"
starting with the issue of the cross-examination of Flanagan.' 6
Flanagan was cross-examined by defense counsel who attempted
to get her to admit "that had she been warned of the 1 percent
possibility of damage to the accessory nerve and the possibility of
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1205-06.
8. Id. at 1206.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1205.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1206.
13. Id. at 1208.
14. Id. at 1210.
15. Id. at 1211.
16. Id. at 1206.
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malignancy that she nevertheless would have authorized the oper-
ation."17 The trial court sustained several objections to questions
about Flanagan's informed consent because a number of questions
along that line were repetitious and assumed facts not in evi-
dence.' 8 Wesselhoeft argued that the trial justice's ruling consti-
tuted reversible error.' 9
The supreme court held that the "scope and extent of cross-
examination are subject to limitations within the sound discretion
of the trial justice," and that such rulings will not be overturned
without a "clear abuse of discretion."20 In addition, the trial court
may, subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard, exclude questions
on cross-examination that could mislead the jury.21 Here, there
was ample evidence regarding Flanagan's informed consent, given
the totality of the evidence to show that errors committed by the
trial justice, if any, were harmless.22
The court next turned to the issue of the plaintiffs cross-exam-
ination of Wesselhoeft and his expert witness, Dr. Peter Altman,
while using treatises that had not been authenticated. 23 The use
of treatises is proper, pursuant to Rule 803(18), if "'established as
a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or
by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the
statements may be read into evidence, but may not be received as
exhibits.'" 24 The attorneys properly used two medical journals, 25
but Flanagan argued that without the evidence suggested in other
unauthenticated journals, there was no evidence to support a jury
verdict on the negligence count. The court held the trial justice
erred by permitting the use of the unauthenticated articles in cer-
tain medical journals. 26 However, the court stated that that the
refusal by Wesselhoeft and Altman to recognize as authoritative
these articles "strained all credulity."27 Moreover, other evidence,
including admissions by Wesselhoeft himself, "would certainly
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1207.
19. Id. at 1206.
20. Id. at 1207.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 803(18)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1209.
27. Id.
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have supported a jury determination of negligence."28 Thus, any
error was not prejudicial. 29
The court next turned to whether the trial justice erred by al-
lowing the deposition of John Flanagan, the father of Ashley, to be
read to the jury.30 The deposition contained hearsay statements
made by other doctors, which concluded that Wesselhoeft had not
properly isolated and avoided injury to the accessory nerve.3l The
court found the reading of the deposition to be a violation of Rules
801(c) and 802 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.3 2 Although
a deposition may be read into evidence, it must be admissible evi-
dence.33 Here, the evidence was hearsay and not admissible.3 4
However, this error was harmless given the existence of other evi-
dence that supported the jury's finding that defendant was negli-
gent in failing to isolate and avoid injury to the nerve.35
Lastly, the court addressed plaintiffs cross-appeal challenging
the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute which provides that
"prejudgment interest in medical malpractice actions begins on the
date of the written notice of the claim or the filing of the action,
whichever occurs first."36 The court indicated that the law was
constitutional, but did not rule specifically on the issue, as the
plaintiffs had not served the Attorney General a copy of their chal-
lenge in superior court.37 Since the Attorney General was not
given the opportunity to be heard at the trial level, there was no
issue that could be properly reviewed.38
CONCLUSION
In Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that: the trial court did not abuse its discretion refusing to
allow a repetitious cross-examination; articles from two medical
journals were not admissible for cross-examination when the jour-
28. Id. at 1210.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1211.
32. Id. at 1210.
33. Id. (quoting Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 32).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1211.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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nals had not authenticated the articles; deposition testimony was
inadmissible hearsay in medical malpractice trial, where the decla-
rations were offered to prove that the surgeon had violated the
standard of care; and the plaintiffs failed to preserve appellate re-
view because the Attorney General had not been served with a
copy of the proceeding and had not been given an opportunity to be
heard at the trial level.
Joseph M. Proietta
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Tort Law. Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2001). A
town is engaged in a governmental function when issuing an en-
tertainment license and is therefore is generally protected from lia-
bility, subject to certain exceptions, under the public-duty doctrine.
However, when a town does not inquire about possible conditions
that could result in harm to the public before granting the en-
tertainment license, the issuance of the license can be considered
egregious conduct and the town loses its protection under the pub-
lic-duty doctrine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Frank Hopkins conducted an annual outdoor festival on his
property in the Town of Burrillville that grew from 175 attendees
in 1979 to approximately 4500 attendees in 1992.' By 1990, before
issuing an entertainment license to Hopkins, the Burrillville Town
Council required Hopkins to hire a private security firm, ensure
that the music was shut down by midnight, provide an adequate
number of outdoor toilets, and assume responsibility for the ex-
pense of detail police officers called in by the Chief of Police.2 Hop-
kins only ordered fifty portable toilets to accommodate over 4000
people for the 1992 festival and he told the security firm that he
hired that there would only be 2000 to 2500 people in attendance.3
In response to Hopkins' representation about numbers, the Chief
of Police only assigned seven police officers to assist him in han-
dling police duties at the festival.4
That evening, the crowd quickly grew to about 4500 people.6
Free beer was served in mugs, as well as in quart, one-gallon and
five-gallon containers. 6 Before long, numerous people became
drunk and unruly.7 The lines to the outdoor toilets grew so long
that people began to climb over a snow fence that had been set up
along the parameter of the property in order to relieve themselves
in the woods.8 Although the Chief of Police had become aware that
the crowd had become intoxicated and unruly, he made no attempt
1. Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id. at 1162.
3. Id. at 1163.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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to close down the festival for fear that the crowd might riot.9 The
Chief of Police also allowed the band to play fifteen minutes past
the midnight deadline. 10 However, the band did not stop playing
until the Chief of Police threatened them at 12:30 a.m." Mean-
while, between midnight and 12:20 a.m., a group of rowdy at-
tendees climbed over the plastic fence and while doing so, a rotted
tree, to which the fence was attached, toppled and fell upon
Michael Martinelli rendering him a paraplegic. 12 Martinelli later
commenced this action.
Before the trial, a consent order was entered granting the
town's motion for partial summary judgment and the town's liabil-
ity was capped at $100,000 pursuant to section 9-31-3 of the Gov-
ernment Tort Liability Act. 13 A superior court jury awarded
Martinelli $2 million and determined the town was twenty percent
negligent. 14 The trial justice found that the town was acting in a
governmental function when it issued the entertainment license,
but the town's conduct in both issuing the license and in not con-
taining the festival once it got out of hand was egregious, therefore
it was liable under the egregious conduct exception to public-duty
doctrine and was not protected from liability.15 Therefore, in ac-
cordance with the consent order that had been entered into by the
town and section 9-31-3, the trial justice limited Martinelli's recov-
ery from the town to $100,000.16
After the trial, the town renewed its motion for judgment as a
matter of law, claiming that Martinelli failed to show that the
town's actions were the proximate cause of his injuries. 17 In the
alternative, the town filed a motion for a new trial.'8 Martinelli
filed a post-trial motion seeking relief from the consent order ear-
lier agreed upon by counsel for both parties. 19 He sought relief
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1164. Section 9-31-3 provides "in any tort action against any city of
town... , any damages covered therein shall not exceed the sum of $100,000 .... "
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-3 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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from the statutory cap on the town's liability asserting that the
town's police detail, while performing security guard type activities
at the festival, was acting in a private function and not in a govern-
mental function and in doing so, they acted in a negligent man-
ner.20 The trial justice denied all of the motions and both the
plaintiff and the town filed cross-appeals with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, which denied the cross-appeals and affirmed the
lower court's judgment.21
ANALYSiS AND HOLDING
In his appeal, Martinelli argued for the abolition of the public-
duty doctrine and, in the alternative, that the public-duty doctrine
should not apply in this case because the police were carrying out
the same duties as those carried out by the private security de-
tail.2 2 He also argued that two exceptions to the public-duty doc-
trine were applicable to the case.23 While the court found
Martinelli's argument for the abolition of the public-duty doctrine
compelling, the court refused to consider these arguments because
of the stipulated agreement between the parties limiting his recov-
ery from the town to $100,000 in damages. 24
The town claimed on appeal that the trial justice erred in ap-
plying the public-duty doctrine's egregious conduct exception to the
facts of the case. The court held that while the town was engaged
in a governmental function when it issued the entertainment li-
cense to Hopkins and therefore protected under the public-duty
doctrine, the fact that it acted in an egregious manner stripped the
town's immunity from liability. 25 Under the public-duty doctrine,
the immunity enjoyed by the state is lifted in three situations:
when the state owes a special duty to the defendant, when the act
is egregious, and when the state is performing a duty normally
performed by a private entity.26
The court found that in past years the Chief of Police had ob-
jected to the issuance of Hopkins' permit, stating that each year
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1164-65.
22. Id. at 1166.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1166-67.
25. Id. at 1167.
26. Id. (citing Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District, 755 A.2d
153, 155 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1053 (R.I. 1998))).
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problems associated with the crowds at the festival had escalated
and that the Chief of Police made the council aware of the large
crowds and the mass consumption of free beer.27 In light of this
information, the town continued to issue permits for the festival
without ever inspecting the premises in which the festival was tak-
ing place.28 The town was on notice that the large crowds and un-
ruly behavior presented certain risk to the spectators and by
issuing the entertainment license nonetheless, the town acted in
an egregious manner.29
The town also claimed that even if it was negligent, there was
no evidence to show that the town's negligence caused Martinelli's
injuries.30 The town argued that the causal connection between
negligence and a plaintiff's injury must be shown by evidence and
not based on speculation.31 The court stated that while the town's
argument is true, negligence and proximate cause may also be
shown by reasonable inference from the facts. 32 The court con-
cluded that the town should have know of the dangers inherent in
a large crowd gathering together to consume large quantities of
free beer.33 The town failed to inquire about the quantities of free
beer that would be offered, the number of toilets that would be
available, or the number of security personnel that would be on
hand.34 The court also pointed out the fact that even though the
Chief of Police was aware that the event was out of hand by 11:30
p.m., despite his authority to shut the event down at any time, he
did not force the band to stop playing until 12:30 a.m. 35 It was
during this time period in which Martinelli received his injuries.36
The court held that the town's negligent issuance of the license,
coupled with the Chief of Police's failure to close down the event
once it became unruly, was a proximate cause of Martinelli's
injury.
27. Id. at 1168.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1168-69.
30. Id. at 1169.
31. Id. (quoting Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veteran's Association, Inc., 713 A.2d 766,
771 (R.I. 1998)).
32. Id. (quoting McLaughlin v. Moura, 754 A.2d 95, 98 (R.I. 2000) (quoting
Skalling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 282, 288 (R.I. 1999))).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1169-70.
36. Id.
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CONCLUSION
A town is engaged in a governmental function when issuing an
entertainment license and is therefore protected from liability
under the public-duty doctrine. However, when a town does not
inquire about possible conditions that could lead to harm to the
public upon granting the entertainment license, the issuance of the
license can be considered egregious conduct and the town loses its
protection under the public-duty doctrine.
Joe H. Lawson II
SURVEY SECTION
Tort Law. Ohms v. State Dept. of Trans., 764 A.2d 725 (R.I. 2001).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a moped lessor had no
duty to warn a lessee of hazards that might be encountered on all
the highways, roadways, and trailways upon which a lessee may
travel.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Joanne S. Ohms (Ohms or plaintiff) leased a moped from
Aldo's Mopeds, Inc. (Aldo's or defendant) to tour Block Island on or
about August 5, 1994.1 Ohms had signed a lease agreement,
which, among other things, contained a warning regarding the
hazardous travel conditions that were present on Block Island.2
Ohms had experience with driving mopeds on Block Island, having
done so on four other occasions. 3 However, on August 5, 1994, the
plaintiff took an outing to a portion of the island that she had
never previously explored.4 During this expedition, the moped
"tipped and 'went down' on the road."5 Ohms alleged that she was
injured as a result of gravel, pebbles, and debris in the road which
caused the moped to go down. 6
Ohms filed a negligence suit against Aldo's, "alleging that it
had failed to warn her of known and/or foreseeable conditions that
existed on the roads on which people might drive a moped on Block
Island."7 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
which a justice of the superior court granted, holding that Aldo's
did not have a duty to warn Ohms or any other lessee about dan-
gerous conditions that exist on public roads.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court stated that whether Aldo's had a duty to
inform the plaintiff of the existence of dangerous road conditions
was a question of law to be decided by the trial or motion justice.9
The court also stated that a summary judgment would be affirmed
1. Ohms v. State Dept. of Trans., 764 A.2d 725, 726 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id, at 727.
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if the court, after de novo review, concludes "that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."' 0 The court concluded that there
exists no duty on the part of the lessor of a vehicle to warn a lessee
of hazards that may be encountered on various roadways over
which the lessee may travel." The court also concluded that the
warning found in the lease agreement was adequate to apprise the
plaintiff of any roadway dangers she might encounter. 12
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed the
plaintiffs appeal, finding no error with the court's finding that
there was no duty on the lessor to wan a lessee of possible hazards.
Michelle M. Alves
10. Id. (citing Woodland Manor III Assocs. v. Keeney, 713 A.2d 806, 810 (R.I.
1998) (quoting Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I. 1996)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
